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Immigration Law-RACE AND NATIONAL ORIGIN
DISCRIMINATION AND THE HAITIAN DETAINEES-Jean v. Nelson,
105 S. Ct. 2992 (1985)
I. INTRODUCTION
Since Yick Wo v. Hopkins' in 1886, the United States Supreme
Court has considered numerous cases involving the immigration
status of foreign-born individuals who questioned whether they
were protected by the Constitution when they sought entry into
the United States.2 The latest major immigration case to reach the
Court was brought by a group of Haitian refugees seeking asylum3
in this country. Jean v. Nelson4 (Jean III) was a class action on
behalf of Haitian refugees who were detained' by the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) upon their arrival in South Flor-
ida in 1981. In a series of cases6 that began in the United States
1. 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (fourteenth amendment guarantees equal protection to all persons
within territorial jurisdiction of the United States).
2. See generally Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1
(1984); Note, Constitutional Limits on the Power to Exclude Aliens, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 957
(1982).
3. Under the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 207(c)(1), 94 Stat. 102, 103
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1982)), the attorney general has the discretion to admit
into this country any person who is unable or unwilling to return to his or her country of
nationality "because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion."
4. 105 S. Ct. 2992 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Jean III]. The class was originally certified
to include:
[Aill Haitian aliens who have arrived in the Southern District of Florida on or
after May 20, 1981, who are applying for entry into the U.S. and who are presently
held in detention pending exclusion proceedings at various INS detention facili-
ties, for whom an order of exclusion has not been entered and who are unrepre-
sented by counsel.
Louis v. Meissner, 530 F. Supp. 924, 930 (S.D. Fla. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Louis i].
The class definition was subsequently expanded to include those Haitian detainees "rep-
resented by counsel pro bono publico assigned by the Haitian Refugee Volunteer Lawyer
Task Force of the Dade County Bar Association." Louis v. Meissner, 532 F. Supp. 881, 884
(S.D. Fla. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Louis II].
5. Detention is authorized under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (1982). "Every alien ... who may
not appear to the examining immigration officer at the port of arrival to be clearly and
beyond a doubt entitled to land shall be detained for further inquiry." Id.
6. This series of seven cases is briefly and chronologically described as follows:
Louis I (Louis v. Meissner, 530 F. Supp. 924 (S.D. Fla. 1981)) was an action seeking a
preliminary injunction to prevent INS from deporting Haitian refugees.
Louis II (Louis v. Meissner, 532 F. Supp. 881 (S.D. Fla 1982)) was a petition for writ of
habeas corpus and request for declaratory and injunctive relief based on seven different
issues regarding the exclusion proceedings. Because the Haitians had not exhausted their
administrative remedies, and because the INS assured that individual exclusion hearings
would be held, the court dismissed several claims and directed the INS to submit a plan
detailing the manner in which the exclusion hearings would be conducted.
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District Court for the Southern District of Florida, the issues were
narrowed until ultimately the Supreme Court was asked to decide
whether the authority of the attorney general to parole7 aliens
pending a determination on exclusion" is limited by the fifth
amendment. In a six-to-two decision, the Court evaded the consti-
tutional issue by concluding that INS regulations resolved the
issue.9
Jean III presented the Court with an opportunity to clarify a
critical issue which is repeatedly raised in immigration law. In-
stead, the Court evaded the matter: while appearing to follow the
settled principle of refraining to address a constitutional question
Doris Meissner, Acting Commissioner of the INS when the Haitians' suit was filed, was
succeeded by Alan C. Nelson.
Louis III (Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Fla. 1982)) was the trial of the case in
which the Haitian refugees challenged the parole and detention policies of the INS. The
court held there had been no race or national origin discrimination against the Haitians, but
that the INS had adopted a new parole policy in violation of the notice and comment re-
quirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982).
Louis IV (Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D. Fla. 1982)) comprised the district
court's determination of how to implement its ruling in Louis III. The court ordered release
of 2,000 Haitians in detention and dissolved the injunction issued in Louis I, directing the
INS to conduct individual exclusion hearings for all Haitian refugees.
Jean I (Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455 (11th Cir. 1983)) was an appeal by the government
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, challenging the release order
of Louis IV. The Haitians cross-appealed the district court's rulings adverse to the class. A
three-judge panel affirmed the release based on the APA violation and reversed the lower
court on the discrimination issue, holding that INS had impermissibly discriminated against
the Haitians in making parole determinations.
Jean II (Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984)) was a rehearing by the court en
banc. The court held that excludable aliens have no constitutional rights, therefore, the
panel had improperly made a finding of discrimination. However, the court remanded the
case to determine whether lower-level INS officials had properly adhered to immigration
policy as formulated by the executive and congressional branches.
Jean III (Jean v. Nelson, 105 S. Ct. 2992 (1985)) was the final appeal of the constitutional
issue to the Supreme Court, which held that it need not reach the question of whether
excludable aliens are protected by the Constitution because the statutes and INS regula-
tions prohibit race and national origin discrimination. The Court affirmed the Eleventh Cir-
cuit's remand to the court below for a determination of whether INS officials had adhered to
the laws and regulations in making exclusion determinations.
7. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 212(d)(5), 66
Stat. 163, 188 (codified at 8 U.S.C § 1182(d)(5)(A) (1982)), gives the attorney general discre-
tion to release temporarily, or "parole," an alien into the community during the asylum
application and appeal process, which may last years.
8. In the parlance of immigration law, "exclusion" refers to initial nonadmission of an
alien seeking entry into the country; "deportation" refers to removal of an alien from within
the jurisdiction of the United States. "Deportation" also refers to the act of expelling an
alien once a final order of deportation or exclusion have been issued.
9. Jean III, 105 S. Ct. at 2999.
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when lesser grounds for decision are present, 10 the Court construed
"other grounds" where none existed. Fortunately, the Haitian de-
tainees achieved their desired end: the Court held that considera-
tions of race and national origin may not bear upon parole deci-
sions.1" Nevertheless, judicial decision-making is vulnerable to
criticism when the rationale employed to hurdle a constitutional
issue evades comprehension. This outcome perpetuates the unsa-
vory means by which aliens are denied certain constitutional safe-
guards-the use of a legal fiction, one particularly insidious in that
the fates of thousands of human beings are implicated by its use.
The practice in immigration law of refusing to regard certain per-
sons as "persons" protected by the Bill of Rights, a practice remi-
niscent of the Dred Scott Decision,2 remains intact, undisturbed
by the nation's highest court.13
The purpose of this Note is to review the movement of the Hai-
tian class action through the federal courts and to discuss the im-
plications of the Supreme Court's decision concerning parole policy
in Jean III. In order to discuss these cases thoroughly, explana-
tions of the "excludable" status, its concomitant legal fiction, and a
brief history of the parole policy in immigration law are necessary.
A. Entry Doctrine
Historically, the judiciary has deferred questions of immigration
law to the executive and legislative branches. 4 In the Chinese Ex-
10. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) ("The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly
presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may
be disposed of.").
11. Jean III, 105 S. Ct. at 2998-99.
12. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404-11 (1856) (the words "people of the
United States" in the Constitution do not encompass freed slaves).
13. The word "citizens," indicating a specific class deserving rights not granted "per-
sons" in general, appears in but two contexts: the privileges and immunities clause, U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, and the voting amendments, U.S. CONST. amends. XV, XIX, XXIV,
XXVI.
14. Opinions in immigration law cases often begin with a statement similar to that made
in Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (quoting Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214
U.S. 320, 339 (1909)): "'[Olver no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress
more complete than it is over the admission of aliens.'"
While properly the subject of a separate article, this inordinately deferential stance is
grossly inappropriate when it permits the government to discriminate invidiously against
non-Americans. For a stimulating discussion of how immigration law differs from other ar-
eas of law in terms of this "judicial passivity," and of the likelihood of change, see Schuck,
supra note 2. For an eloquent challenge to the injustice of "judicial abdication," see Hull,
19861
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clusion Case15 of 1889, the Court first articulated the principle that
the power to determine who shall be admitted into the country is a
fundamental prerogative of government, "an incident of sover-
eignty." '16 While the Supreme Court stated that sovereign powers
are "restricted in their exercise only by the Constitution itself,
17 it
made quite a different statement three years later.18 Reviewing a
decision by the California commissioner of immigration refusing
entry to a Japanese woman, the Court stated, "As to such persons,
the decisions of executive or administrative officers, acting within
powers expressly conferred by Congress, are due process of law."1 9
These decisions illustrate the tension that characterize exclusion
decisions and immigration law in general: the power exercised with
regard to excludable aliens is either beyond constitutional protec-
tions, or, like other inherent federal powers, it is bound by the
strictures of the Bill of Rights.2"
While the problem may be framed as whether or not the govern-
ment is constrained by the Constitution in deciding to exclude an
alien, the issue in exclusion cases is more often viewed as whether
a particular alien is protected by the Constitution. The question is
not so much whether the fifth amendment prohibits the govern-
ment from depriving an individual of life, liberty, or property with-
out due process of law, but whether the alien in question is a "per-
son" under the Constitution. Courts often consider excludable
aliens as "stopped at the border."2 Whether confined on Ellis Is-
land in the 1940's or within the Krome North detention camp in
South Florida in the 1980's, the "entry doctrine" fiction22 allows
the INS to characterize excludables as legally "outside" the coun-
try23 and thus beyond the reach of the Bill of Rights.
The Rights of Aliens: National and International Issues, in THE UNAVOIDABLE IsSUE 251
(D. Papademetriou & M. Miller eds. 1983).
15. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
16. Id. at 609.
17. Id. at 604. Additional constraints upon the government include "considerations of
public policy and justice which control, more or less, the conduct of all civilized nations." Id.
18. Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892).
19. Id. at 660 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
20. See generally Note, supra note 2, at 966-74.
21. E.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 215 (1953).
22. Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 969 (11th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 2992 (1985) [here-
inafter cited as Jean II].
23. For example, in Mezei, the Court considered the status of aliens awaiting adminis-
trative proceedings and said, "[Hiarborage at Ellis Island is not an entry into the United
States." Mezei, 345 U.S. at 213 (citations omitted). The Court rationalized:
Aliens seeking entry from contiguous lands obviously can be turned back at the
border without more. While the Government might keep entrants by sea aboard
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The entry doctrine can be traced to Nishimura Ekiu v. United
States,2 in which a Japanese immigrant was permitted to stay in a
local mission pending a decision on her admissibility into the coun-
try. There,°the Court said:
I Putting her in the mission house, as a more suitable place than
the steamship, pending the decision of the question of her right
to land ... left her in the same position, so far as regarded her
right to land in the United States, as if she never had been re-
moved from the steamship.2
This statement merely indicates that an alien allowed into the
country by the government has no "right" to stay.2 6 Thirteen years
after Nishimura Ekiu, the concept of limited rights was described
more precisely by Justice Holmes in United States v. Ju Toy:27
"The petitioner, although physically within our boundaries, is to
be regarded as if he had been stopped at the limit of our jurisdic-
tion and kept there while his right to enter was under debate. '2 8
Justice Holmes' statement has been used to justify the entry doc-
trine fiction-that the alien is not yet within the United
States-which is then employed to justify the denial of constitu-
tional rights. 29 Having been permitted to enter the country, an ex-
cludable alien may not take advantage of being on United States
soil to shift his immigration status. This is sound policy designed
to prevent manipulation of an admissibility appraisal, and it
should describe the limits of the entry doctrine. However, it has
been extended: because the alien technically has not entered the
the vessel pending determination of their admissibility, resulting hardships to the
alien and inconvenience to the carrier persuaded Congress to adopt a more gener-
ous course. By statute it authorized, in cases such as this, aliens' temporary re-
moval from ship to shore. But such temporary harborage, an act of legislative
grace, bestows no additional rights. Congress meticulously specified that such
shelter ashore "shall not be considered a landing."... [The alien] is treated as if
stopped at the border.
Id. at 215 (citations omitted).
24. 142 U.S. 651 (1892).
25. Id. at 661.
26. That policy was not questioned in Jean III, nor is it at issue in this Note. The ex-
cludable alien is in a different position from the alien who has succeeded in illegally entering
the country. Because the deportable alien has begun establishing ties in America, he or she
is conceded a fifth amendment due process right to a deportation hearing. The Japanese
Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 99-101 (1903). The petitioners in Jean III did not argue that
detention of excludables should automatically shift their status to that of deportable aliens.
27. 198 U.S. 253 (1905).
28. Id. at 263.
29. See Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212; Jean II, 727 F.2d at 970.
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country for purposes of determining admissibility, he or she is also
held not to have physically entered. Hence, the excludable alien is
outside United States jurisdiction and unprotected from govern-
mental abuse by the Constitution-or so the argument goes. But as
one court has noted, "The legal fiction that an excludable alien is
'waiting at the border' wears quite thin after a year at the Atlanta
Federal Penitentiary. "30
In contrast, resident aliens are protected by some provisions of
the Constitution. In Mathews v. Diaz,-" Justice Stevens empha-
sized that the fifth and fourteenth amendments guarantee that no
resident alien may be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law,32 although such aliens are still denied enjoy-
ment of other constitutional rights granted to citizens. 33
B. Parole Policy
Between 1892 and 1954, Ellis Island was the nation's chief immi-
gration station, serving as a detention and screening site for pro-
spective immigrants. The facility was closed after the INS Com-
missioner declared that "mass detention was inhumane and
unnecessary. '3 4 In 1954, the Attorney General announced that the
INS would detain only those excludables "likely to abscond or...
whose freedom of movement could be adverse to the national se-
curity or the public safety. '3 5 Soon after the closing of Ellis Island
30. Soroa-Gonzalez v. Civiletti, 515 F. Supp. 1049, 1056 n.3 (N.D. Ga. 1981). The Krome
Avenue North Center (Krome North) in Dade County, Fla., was a military facility converted
into a detention camp for Mariel Cubans and Haitian refugees. Severe overcrowding, sepa-
ration of families, and stultifying boredom were some of the conditions most frequently
protested. J.C. MILLER, THE PLIGHT OF HAITIAN REFUGEES 127-28 (1984). Psychological and
physical problems developed among the incarcerated. Id. at 127-30; Suicide Attempts Re-
ported Rising Among Haitians in U.S. Detention, N.Y. Times, June 22, 1982, at A15, col. 3;
The Shame of Krome, Miami Herald, Jan. 9, 1982, at 18A, col. 1; see Schuck, supra note 2,
at 28 n.149 ("[Tihe length of many detentions and the conditions of confinement suggest
that the term 'imprisonment' more accurately depicts reality.").
31. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
32. Id. at 77. "Even one whose presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary, or tran-
sitory is entitled to [due process] protection." Id. See supra note 13 for a listing of the few
amendments enacted for citizens only. In addition, the privileges and immunities clause of
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, applies only to citizens, as do id. art. I, § 2, cl. 2, id. art. I, § 3, cl. 3,
and id. art. II, § 1, cl. 5, which indicate citizenship requirements for United States repre-
sentatives, senators, and the President, respectively.
33. Diaz, 426 U.S. at 78.
34. Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455, 1469 (11th Cir. 1983), reh'g en banc granted, 714 F.2d
96 (11th Cir. 1983), dismissed in part, rev'd in part, remanded with instructions, 727 F.2d
957 (11th Cir. 1984), afl'd, 105 S. Ct. 2992 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Jean I].
35. Address of the Attorney General, Nov. 11, 1954, 32 INT. REL. No. 12, quoted in Jean
1, 711 F.2d at 1469.
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in 1954, the Supreme Court decided a case involving a woman who
alleged that her release on parole made her eligible for a deporta-
tion hearing. After reiterating that parole has no bearing on the
admissibility status of an alien, the Court commented, "Physical
detention of aliens is now the exception, not the rule, and is gener-
ally employed only as to security risks or those likely to abscond.
Certainly this policy reflects the humane qualities of an enlight-
ened civilization."36
In the late 1970's, however, the INS and Justice Department im-
plemented a "Haitian Program" to process and expel Haitian asy-
lum applicants at an unprecedented rate. A key element of the
program was a denial of parole to Haitians awaiting exclusion
hearings. Then, in 1981, detention became the rule when the Rea-
gan administration initiated a restrictive parole policy in response
to the Mariel boatlift of April 1980, and the increasing number of
Haitian refugees.3" These developments, aimed primarily at Hai-
tians, sparked a massive pro bono effort to protect the minimal
legal rights of these excludables. From this controversy emerged
Louis v. Meissner,5 which culminated in the Supreme Court deci-
sion in Jean v. Nelson.
II. HAITIAN MIGRATION AND LITIGATION
Haitians had been braving the 800-mile ocean journey from Ha-
iti to South Florida since 1972, when sixty-five Haitians in a leaky
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 212(d)(5), 66 Stat.
163, 188 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (d)(5)(A) 1982)), codified the practice of paroling ex-
cludable aliens "temporarily under such conditions as [the attorney general] may prescribe
for emergent reasons or for reasons deemed strictly in the public interest." The statute
continues:
[B]ut such parole of [an] alien shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien
and when the purposes of such parole shall, in the opinion of the Attorney Gen-
eral, have been served the alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the cus-
tody from which he was paroled and thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt
with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the
United States.
Id.
36. Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 190 (1958) (citation omitted).
37. Approximately 125,000 Cubans were brought into the United States by the "Free-
dom Flotilla." By the beginning of 1981, an estimated 35,000 undocumented Haitians had
arrived in South Florida. Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 973, 978 (S.D. Fla. 1982), enforced,
544 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D Fla. 1982), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Jean v. Nelson, 711
F.2d 1455 (11th Cir. 1983), reh'd en banc granted, 714 F.2d 96 (11th Cir. 1983), dismissed in
part, rev'd in part, remanded with instructions, 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984), afi'd, 105 S.
Ct. 2992 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Louis III].
38. 530 F. Supp. 924 (S.D. Fla. 1981); see supra note 6.
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sloop arrived in Pompano Beach."9 Most who fled Haiti's political
repression and poverty chose the Bahamas as the most suitable
country for a new life.40 But in 1978 the Bahamian government
stepped up its expulsion policy to improve employment prospects
for its own citizens. 41 Haitian "boat people" sought refuge in the
United States in greater numbers, and by 1980, Haitian exclusion
cases had multiplied tenfold. 2
A. The Haitian Influx into the United State
When Haitians applied for political asylum in the United States,
they were usually rejected because they were thought to be fleeing
economic hardship rather than political persecution.4 3 Haitians
and those who supported their status as bona fide refugees dis-
puted the rationality of drawing a line between economic and po-
litical exigencies in Haiti's repressive dictatorship.4 ' Critics of cur-
rent refugee policy also charged that despite the Refugee Act of
39. J.C. MILLER, supra note 30, at 62; Stepick, Haitian Boat People: A Study in the
Conflicting Forces Shaping U.S. Immigration Policy, in U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY 163 (R.
Hofstetter ed. 1984).
40. Historic hostility between the Dominican Republic and Haiti militated against ex-
tensive movement across that border. The need for laborers in the sugar fields of Cuba at
one time attracted large numbers of Haitians, but this ceased when Fidel Castro came to
power. The limited employment opportunity in Jamaica discouraged migration to that coun-
try. And immigration to France and French Canada was limited to those who could gather
the necessary resources. J.C. MILLER, supra note 30, at 37-58.
41. J. CREWDSON, THE TARNISHED DOOR 72 (1983).
42. J.C. MILLER, supra note 30, at xii. The following table shows the annual number of
Haitian arrivals to the United States subject to exclusion and deportation proceedings:





In comparison, the Mariel boatlift brought 124,789 Cubans in 1980. Between 1975 and 1981,
600,424 Southeast Asians immigrated to the United States. Id. at xii-xiii.
43. See supra note 3.
44. A review of Haitian history points out the difficulty of separating economic from
political factors. During almost two centuries of political instability, the military and eco-
nomic elite have consistently dominated the rural 80% of the nation's people. B. WEINSTEIN
& A. SEGAL, HAITI; POLITICAL FAILURES, CULTURAL SUCCESSES 5 (1984). Upset by Haitian
hostility toward the United States on the eve of World War I, the United States occupied
the island in 1915 and remained for 20 years. Post-occupation dictators have received inter-
mittent military and economic aid from the United States.
Francoise "Papa Doc" Duvalier was elected President in 1957 and used his paramilitary
forces, the tontons macoute, to crush. his opposition. His son and successor, Jean-Claude
"Baby Doc" Duvalier, used the same coercive tactics and neglected the rural populace. Id. at
1-130. See generally C.R. FOSTER & A. VALDMAN, HAITI-TODAY AND TOMORROW, AN INTER-
DISCIPLINARY STUDY (1984).
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1980, 45 which was designed to eliminate the Communist/non-Com-
munist approach to grants of asylum, the United States still grants
"a blanket presumption of persecution to those fleeing Communist
states, while maintaining a far stricter standard for those fleeing
rightist authoritarian regimes. 46
In the early years of Haitian migration, the INS typically pa-
roled applicants for asylum into the community.47 But, even before
the Mariel exodus from Cuba and the arrival of more than 22,000
Haitians in 1981, INS policy concerning Haitians had significantly
changed. In mid-1978, there was a staggering deportation caseload
resulting not from a sudden wave of immigration but from the
"slow trickle" of Haitians who had arrived during the past dec-
ade. 48 To deal with the massive overload, the INS initiated an "ac-
celerated processing of Haitian cases,' 4" a project dubbed the Hai-
tian Program. Pursuant to written instructions51 and personal
In recent years almost 50% of government income fell into private pockets, and while
80% to 90% of the people were farmers, only 7% to 10% of the national budget was
earmarked for agriculture. "It must be recognized that for Haiti-perhaps more than for
any other country in the nonsocialist world-the term 'political economy' is most appropri-
ate." Stepick, supra note 39, at 175-76.
After Baby Doc and his family fled Haiti on Feb. 7, 1986, Haitians began returning from
exile in the United States and other countries. Haiti's Exiles, Returning Steadily, Carry
Home Formulas for Change, N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1986, at 1, col. 3. This development may
mark the end of illegal Haitian immigration to the United States, but given Haiti's long,
tortured history, a recurrence is not impossible.
45. See supra note 3.
46. Stepick, supra note 39, at 168. For example, of more than 5,000 Haitian applications
for asylum in 1982, only seven were granted. E. HULL, WITHOUT JUSTICE FOR ALL 139 (1985).
In comparison, in 1984, 51% of Russian, 39% of Rumanian, 43% of Afghan, and 33% of
Polish applications were granted. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 37-38,
American Baptist Churches v. Meese, No. C85-3255 RFP (N.D. Cal. filed May 7, 1985).
Between 1980 and 1982, 463,665 refugees were admitted; of these, only 393 came from non-
Communist nations. Anker, The Development of U.S. Refugee Legislation, in IN DEFENSE
OF THE ALIEN 162 (L. Tomasi ed. 1984). Its Cold War orientation makes suspect the integrity
of the United States' asylum policy, suggesting that the policy is merely a tool of American
foreign policy. "It is not altogether clear that family reunion or economic motives are less
important in these movements from Communist countries." Keely, Current Status of U.S.
Immigration and Refugee Policy, in U.S. IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY 349 (M. Kritz
ed. 1983).
47. Louis III, 544 F. Supp. at 978.
48. Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023, 1029 (5th Cir. 1982). Between six
and seven thousand deportation cases had accumulated in the Miami INS office. Id.
49. Id. at 1030.
50. Id. at 1029-30.
51. One such letter asserted that Haitians were economic rather than political refugees,
and that "favorable treatment of these Haitians would encourage further immigration." Id.
1986]
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visits52 by immigration officials, deportation hearings jumped from
an average of five per day to between fifty-five and eighty. Average
asylum interviews were reduced from ninety to thirty minutes,
with language translation limiting actual dialogue to fifteen min-
utes. Hearings on deportation, withholding deportation, and asy-
lum were simultaneously scheduled at various locations, forcing
the twelve attorneys who were representing thousands of Haitians
to miss some clients' proceedings.5 3 Several of lawsuits were filed to
challenge these procedures, and, in 1979, an injunction prohibiting
INS from ordering further deportations ended the eight-month
Haitian Program."
This harsh treatment of Haitians, however, did not end; it inten-
sified following the Mariel boatlift. In 1980, President Carter desig-
nated the Marielitos and Haitians as "entrants," entitling them to
resettle in the United States with the aid of local organizations. 5
Shortly after taking office in 1981, President Reagan appointed a
task force to examine the nation's immigration policy and prac-
tices. One of the group's recommendations, approved by the Presi-
dent and implemented by the INS, was to replace the liberal pa-
role policy with one of detention, 56 reviving the practice that had
virtually ceased with the closing of Ellis Island almost thirty years
earlier.
Krome North, a former missile base 57 on the outskirts of Miami,
was used to process the Haitian and Cuban entrants. Sheer num-
at 1030. This was damning in that each person applying for asylum in the United States is
implicitly entitled to an individual determination of whether there is good cause for a "well-
founded fear of persecution." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1982); 8 C.F.R. § 208 (1986).
52. The INS Deputy Commissioner encouraged INS trial attorneys to recognize "'THE
DIMENSIONS OF THE HAITIAN THREAT' and the fact that 'these are unusual cases
dealing with individuals that are threatening the community's well-being-socially & eco-
nomically.'" Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023, 1030 (5th Cir. 1982).
53. Id. at 1031-32. "None of the over 4,000 Haitians processed during this program were
granted asylum." In fact, the forms on which daily totals from the proceedings were re-
corded had no space provided for registering grants of asylum-only denials. The United
Nations High Commission on Refugees charged that less than half of asylum applicants
were even granted interviews. Stepick, supra note 39, at 183.
54. Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980), modified sub
nom. Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982).
55. Louis III, 544 F. Supp. at 979.
56. Id. at 979-80. Detention was officially initiated between May 20 and July 31, 1981.
Id. at 981. President Reagan also approved an interdiction program authorizing the Coast
Guard to patrol the seas beyond United States territory and return all vessels apprehended
that carried undocumented aliens. Exec. Order No. 12,324, 17 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
1057 (Sept. 29, 1981).
57. Helton, Political Asylum Under the 1980 Refugee Act, in IN DEFENSE OF THE ALIEN
204 (L. Tomasi ed. 1984).
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bers continued to overwhelm the INS, illustrated by the more than
11,000 Haitian asylum claims pending in February 1981.18 INS offi-
cials began holding mass exclusion hearings in early June to com-
bat the backlog. These hearings were frequently conducted in
locked courtrooms where access was denied even to the Haitians'
counsel. Translation from Creole was so inaccurate that the Hai-
tians were, for the most part, unable to understand either their
rights or courtroom dialogue.59 These grossly inadequate proceed-
ings resulted in deportation orders for ninety Haitians,0 eleven of
whom were sent back to Haiti before a court order halted the
practice."'
B. Litigation in United States District Courts
In response to the mass hearings, the National Emergency Civil
Liberties Committee (NECLC) won a temporary restraining order
preventing further action on the deportation orders until INS con-
ducted new hearings.6 2 While the rehearings were pending, INS be-
gan transferring Haitians from the overcrowded Krome North de-
tention center to facilities outside Florida, including Fort Drum,
New York; the federal penitentiary in Lexington, Kentucky; and
Fort Allen, Puerto Rico. s Because the pro bono team organizing
litigation strategy for the Haitians was centered in Miami, as were
the Creole translators, the move effectively deprived the Haitians
of legal representation." The NECLC filed a successful class action
on the Haitians' behalf requesting an injunction against further ex-
58. Stepick, supra note 39, at 189.
59. Jean I, 711 F.2d at 1462-63.
60. Kurzban, The Haitian Saga, 11 IMMIGRATION NEWSLETrER 1 (Nov.-Dec. 1982).
61. Jean I, 711 F.2d at 1463 n.1.
62. Kurzban, Eleventh Circuit Vindicates Haitians' Claim of Discrimination, 12 IMMI-
GRATION NEWSLETTER 3 (May-June 1983).
63. J. CREWDSON, supra note 41, at 87. The INS asserted the moves were necessary in
order to comply with the representation it had made to the state of Florida in Graham v.
Smith, No. 81-1497-CIV-JE (S.D. Fla. 1981), a suit brought by Florida against the United
States to alleviate overcrowding at Krome North. See Louis III, 544 F. Supp. at 983 n.27.
64. Louis I, 530 F. Supp. at 926. Judge Hastings said:
Indeed, even though INS officials have been rudderless in the enunciation and
application of an immigration policy, when they decided to move the Haitians to
these remote areas, they acted with laser-like precision.. . . INS has distributed
them to remote areas lacking attorneys with experience in immigration law, or for
that matter, any attorneys at all willing to represent them.
Id.
Excludable aliens have a statutory right to private counsel in connection with exclusion
proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (1982); 8 C.F.R. § 236.2(c) (1986). Some Haitians transferred
from Krome North were given incorrect telephone numbers of attorneys, correct numbers
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clusion hearings 5 In Louis I, the district court converted the pre-
viously issued temporary restraining order into a preliminary in-
junction prohibiting the INS from continuing any exclusion
proceedings involving members of the now-certified class, unrepre-
sented Haitians who had arrived in Florida since May 20, 1981.66
The plaintiffs6 7 subsequently sought release of the incarcerated
Haitians through a writ of habeas corpus and a complaint for de-
claratory, injunctive, and mandatory class action relief.68 INS offi-
cials were cited with seven counts of violating the Haitians' rights
to fair exclusion proceedings and counsel."9 The court dismissed
each claim that would be encompassed by an ultimate order of ex-
clusion ° citing the Immigration and Nationality Act provision
that authorizes judicial review of an exclusion order by habeas
corpus proceedings only after a final order has been given and the
alien has exhausted all administrative remedies.71 These claims es-
sentially charged that the refugees were denied representation dur-
ing both preliminary interviews with INS and the exclusion pro-
ceedings, and that the INS had failed to give proper notice to the
Haitians regarding their rights.72 The court reserved jurisdiction
over claims that INS had changed its parole and detention policy
yet no access to telephones, long-distance numbers, or numbers of organizations unable to
provide representation. Louis I, 530 F. Supp. at 926-27.
65. Louis I, 530 F. Supp. at 929-30.
66. Id. at 930. For the precise class definition, see supra note 4.
67. Plaintiffs also included the Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., a nonprofit corporation or-
ganized to provide support and legal advocacy for Haitian refugees. Louis III, 544 F. Supp.
at 984 n.28.
68. Louis II, 532 F. Supp. at 883.
69. Id. The court dismissed four counts entirely and two counts in part because of the
lack of subject matter jurisdiction as well as the refugees' lack of standing; the court re-
tained jurisdiction over one count and part of two others. The court modified the definition
of the class to include detained Haitians "represented by counsel pro bono publico assigned
by the Haitian Refugee Volunteer Lawyer Task Force of the Dade County Bar Association."
Id. at 884-85.
70. Louis II, 532 F. Supp. at 888. The Haitians argued that the INA provision was not
intended to preclude review of "separate or preliminary matters" before entry of an order,
but only review of a final order itself or findings made during an exclusion hearing after the
proceedings had concluded. According to the court, however, Congress intended to eliminate
entirely dilatory procedural attacks in order to consolidate the procedure available for chal-
lenging an exclusion order. Judicial efficiency requires that administrative proceedings
should be completed before a complainant may be permitted to attack errors. Id. at 886-87.
Closely associated with the requirement of finality was the court's finding that plaintiffs
lacked standing to complain of potential injury from improper procedures when no final
orders of exclusion had been issued. Id. at 889-92.
71. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c) (1982).
72. Such rights included right to counsel, to select either a public or private hearing, and
to apply for political asylum. Id. at 883-84.
IMMIGRATION LAW
for Haitians without complying with the rulemaking requirements
of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),73 that detained Hai-
tians were denied access to persons not in detention, and that the
Haitian Refugee Center was denied access to detainees, all in viola-
tion of the first amendment. The court also reserved jurisdiction
over the claim that the INS was discriminating against Haitian ref-
ugees on the basis of race and national origin by detaining them
and no other refugees, in violation of the equal protection clause of
the fifth amendment .7 The court ordered the INS to develop and
file a plan describing how the agency would conduct individual
hearings for members of the class.7 5
The trial challenging INS parole and detention policies began in
1982. Thousands of Haitians had been incarcerated since INS res-
urrected its detention policy one year. Many were suffering physi-
cally and psychologically from the prolonged inactivity and con-
finement, and the National Institute of Mental Health discovered
an "alarming increase" in psychiatric illness. Nearly thirty suicide
attempts or "gestures" were reported within a ten-week period in
early 1982 .7 Newspapers carried daily articles and photographs of
Haitians looking beyond the confines of the caged detention
camps, and protesters frequently posted themselves in front of
Krome North.7
In Louis III, the district court held that the detention policy,
although not applied to the Haitians discriminatorily, violated the
Administrative Procedure Act and was void. 8 The court ordered
the class released on parole pending final determination of admis-
73. Administrative Procedure Act § 553, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982).
74. Louis II, 532 F. Supp. at 883-84, 889.
75. Id. at 892-93.
76. Suicide Attempts Reported Rising Among Haitians in U.S. Detention, N.Y. Times,
June 22, 1982, at A15, col. 3. "Suicidal gestures" were defined as "less likely to be fatal"
than actual attempts. Id.
77. U.S. Judge Voids Policy on Detention of Haitians, N.Y. Times, June 19, 1982, at 8,
col. 2.
78. Louis III, 544 F. Supp. at 1003-04. The APA requires an administrative agency to
publish new substantive rules in the Federal Register to permit comment from interested
members of the public. The agency must then publish the final rule and entertain petitions
regarding repeal, revision, or issuance of the rule. Id. at 993-94. The INS adopted more
restrictive criteria for granting parole pursuant to the Reagan task force recommendations
of detention. Except for "significant humanitarian reasons" such as pregnancy, old age,
health problems, or reuniting families, id. at 993, the agency did not publish the new "rule."
Although the parole authority of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(a) (1982) had not been changed, the
APA definition of "rule" requiring publication includes codifying the criteria for parole. Ad-
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sibility.79 Although the Haitians' claim for relief was granted based
on the APA violation, the court also chose to address the discrimi-
nation question. The court affirmed that the determination of ad-
missibility is within the plenary power of Congress, but reasoned
that parole has no bearing on an alien's status with regard to ad-
mission, so discriminatory distinctions Congress may authorize in
exclusion policies are inapplicable to parole decisions. The court
stated, "[The Haitians] are entitled to the same constitutional pro-
tections afforded all persons within the territorial jurisdiction of
the United States. [They] may not be deprived of their liberty
without due process of law and cannot be denied parole solely be-
cause of their race and/or national origin."80 The Haitians asserted
that they were not challenging congressional authority to make ra-
cial or national origin distinctions when enacting immigration leg-
islation, but that because the parole provision was neutral on its
face, discriminatory application violated the fifth amendment
equal protection guarantee."' The Haitians would continue to ad-
vance this argument in subsequent appeals.
Nevertheless, the court found no support for the contention that
the Haitian prgram policies were directed only at Haitians. Rather,
the court concluded, these practices and policies were developed to
handle a general immigration "crisis" and would apply to all illegal
aliens seeking admission."2 Statistical evidence produced by the
ministrative Procedure Act § 2(c), 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1982). The court noted, "A change in a
longstanding informal practice is as much a rule as repeal of a formal regulation if the result
has a substantial impact on those regulated." Louis III, 544 F. Supp. at 997.
79. Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 1004, 1006 (S.D. Fla. 1982), aff'd in part, rev'd in part
sub nom. Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455 (11th Cir. 1983), reh'g en banc granted, 714 F.2d 96
(11th Cir. 1983), dismissed in part, rev'd in part, remanded with instructions, 727 F.2d 957
(11th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 2992 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Louis IV]. The court
found that the first amendment access issue had been mooted in light of the release order in
the final judgment. Id. at 1005 n.2.
80. Louis III, 544 F. Supp at 998 (citations omitted).
81. Id. at 998-99. The court cited Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976), in sup-
port of the Haitians' claim: "A statute, otherwise neutral on its face, must not be applied so
as invidiously to discriminate on the basis of race." Louis III, 544 F. Supp. at 998-99 (cita-
tion omitted).
While the fifth amendment contains no explicit equal protection provision, the Supreme
Court has established in numerous cases that a finding of discrimination by the federal
government, using a fourteenth amendment analysis, would also violate the due process
clause of the fifth amendment. Id. at 999.
82. The court employed a fourteenth amendment approach to the discrimination con-
tention-whether the defendants had intentionally and purposefully detained Haitians on
the basis of race-using the factors set forth in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). Although the Haitians might have felt the impact of
the detention policy more than other excludables, the record indicated the policy was aimed
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Haitians' expert witness showed that Haitians were being detained
longer and were being denied parole more often than were non-
Haitians, indicating "a statistically significant relationship between
being detained and being Haitian." 83 However, the court disputed
the expert's conclusions because the study only compared Haitians
to non-Haitians rather than examining more narrow classes of
"similarly situated individuals."8 Perhaps the court would have
found the data more meaningful had the statistician analyzed
groups of individuals according to characteristics commonly con-
sidered by INS officials when making parole decisions,85 and then
determined whether a discriminatory selection process had been
used.
Having declared the new detention policy void, the court deter-
mined that class members could not be denied parole under the
previous policy that singled out security risks and those likely to
abscond. Thus continued detention was not justified.8" More than
2,000 Haitians were paroled under the order. The INS was also
instructed to desist from detaining newly arrived excludable aliens
until it had promulgated a rule under the APA.8 7
In Louis IV, the district court adopted a schedule of exclusion
hearings, including details that implicitly admonished the agency
to ensure each class member due process. This parole program en-
abled the court to dissolve the Louis I injunction against further
exclusion proceedings.88
C. Appeal to the Eleventh Circuit
The Department of Justice and INS appealed on grounds that
the APA was not applicable to immigration decisions, and there-
fore the Haitians had been improperly released. On cross-appeal
the Haitians argued that the district court had erred in finding no
discrimination by the federal government and in not addressing
the first amendment access issue.89
at deterring another influx. The evidence documenting disproportionate impact was not
enough to persuade the court. Louis III, 544 F. Supp. at 999-1001.
83. Louis 1II, 544 F. Supp. at 982.
84. Id.
85. These factors include age, health, being accompanied by children, and pendency of
an exclusion hearing. Id.
86. Louis IV, 544 F. Supp. at 1006.
87. Id. The former policy was left intact, meaning security risks could still be detained.
88. Id. at 1008.
89. Jean 1, 711 F.2d at 1464.
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In Jean I, the class was again vindicated, this time on all counts,
by a three-member panel of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit. The panel agreed that the restrictive deten-
tion policy had been adopted informally, and thus improperly.9 0 It
found that INS detention and parole policies had been discrimina-
torily enforced against Haitians, and it limited the entry doctrine
to determinations of admissibility.9 The panel concluded that pa-
role decisions could not be made on the basis of race. Lastly, the
panel held that notice of the right to claim asylum should have
been given to the Haitians, e2 and that access to counsel and to cli-
ents is a first amendment right enjoyed by detainees and
advocates.9 3
The panel's decision was vacated when the court granted a re-
hearing en banc9 4 In Jean II, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the
argument that excludable aliens are constitutionally protected
against discriminatory treatment by the government.9 5 Accepting
the government's contention that the INS regulations were facially
neutral, the court remanded the case to permit the district court to
determine whether low-level officials had abused their discretion
by discriminating against the Haitians.9 6 The rule that would con-
trol such a finding was an INS regulation promulgated in 1982 es-
tablishing the criteria immigration officials should employ in fu-
ture parole decisions.9 Because this new rule was developed
90. In litigation that centers around a complex change in policy we find it signifi-
cant that INS inspectors were authorized to perform the task of discretionary pa-
role with a complete lack of guidance. It is clear no one knew exactly what the
policy was, and no one in authority attempted to supervise the exercise of discre-
tion under the new policy. Not surprisingly, the discretion was exercised with
harsh results.
Id. at 1474.
91. Id. at 1484. Rather than conceding that excludable aliens are beyond the reach of the
Constitution, the panel cited several circuit and Supreme Court decisions which have recog-
nized fifth and fourteenth amendment protection of aliens: Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210
(1982) ("Whatever his status under the immigration laws, an alien is surely a 'person' in any
ordinary sense of that term. . . . Aliens. . . have long been recognized as 'persons' guaran-
teed due process of law by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments."); Rodriguez-Fernandez
v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1387 (10th Cir. 1981); United States v. Henry, 604 F.2d 908
(5th Cir. 1979).
92. Jean I, 711 F.2d at 1507.
93. Id. at 1508-09.
94. Jean III, 105 S. Ct. at 2996 (citing 11TH CIR. R. 26(K)).
95. Jean II, 727 F.2d at 968-75.
96. Id. at 978-79.
97. Parole under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1182(d)(5)(A) (1982) may be granted for "emergent
reasons" and applies to those whose medical problems would be aggravated by detention. 8
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according to the notice and comment requirements of the APA,95
the APA claim of Louis II was mooted and dismissed.90 Further-
more, although aliens are entitled to apply for political asylum
under the Refugee Act of 1980,10 the court held that neither the
Constitution, the Act, nor any immigration statutes or regulations
require the INS to notify aliens of such a right.101 Finally, the
court remanded the first amendment access issue, asserting that it
was no longer moot because Haitians again were being held in de-
tention and that failure to address the question below deprived the
court of a record on which to decide the issue.102
The bulk of the court's opinion concerned the equal protection
of excludable aliens. Unlike the district court and the
panel-which regarded parole decisions as distinct from admissi-
bility and thus constrained by the fifth amendment-the Eleventh
Circuit viewed parole decisions as "an integral part of the admis-
sions process . . . [permitting] the Executive to discriminate on
the basis of national origin."103 In making this point, the court re-
lied chiefly on the 1953 Supreme Court decision in Shaughnessy v.
United States ex rel. Mezei. 104
C.F.R. § 212.5(a)(1)(2)(1986). "The public interest" warrants parole of pregnant women,
juveniles, persons with close relatives in the United States, those acting as witnesses in offi-
cial proceedings, and "aliens whose continued detention is not in the public interest as de-
termined by the district director." 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(a)(2) (1986).
98. Compliance with the APA requirements are found at 47 Fed. Reg. 30,044 (1982), as
amended 47 Fed. Reg. 46,494 (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 212 and 235) (proposed July 9,
1982 and amended Oct. 19, 1982).
99. Jean II, 727 F.2d at 962.
100. See supra note 3.
101. Jean II, 727 F.2d at 979-83. "In the absence of a constitutional right, the only pro-
cedures to which plaintiffs are entitled are those granted by the statute or agency," and no
explicit notice requirement exists. Id. at 982. The court responded to the Haitians' argu-
ment that a right to asylum is meaningless without the chance of exercising it: "Congress
provides many opportunities to the people of this country without requiring the government
to publicize their availability or to take affirmative action to notify possible beneficiaries."
Id.
102. Id. at 983-84.
103. Id. at 963.
104. 345 U.S. 206 (1953) (5-4 decision). The decision has been harshly criticized.
"[E]xclusion's extraconstitutional status has encouraged and legitimated some of the most
deplorable governmental conduct toward both aliens and American citizens ever recorded in
the annals of the Supreme Court." Schuck, supra note 2, at 20. Mezei is an "aberration"
which "ignore[s] the painful forward steps of a whole century of adjudication." Hart, The
Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66
HARv. L. REV. 1362, 1396 (1953). "[It is] a rather scandalous doctrine, deserving to be distin-
guished, limited, or ignored ...." Martin, Due Process and Membership in the National
Community: Political Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. Prrr. L. REv. 165, 176 (1983).
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In Mezei, an alien was detained on Ellis Island and permanently
excluded from admission based on "information of a confidential
nature, the disclosure of which would be prejudicial to the public
interest."1 5 More than a dozen countries also refused to accept
Mezei, and he filed a series of petitions for writs of habeas corpus
after twenty-one months of confinement.100 When the government
refused to divulge why Mezei was classified as a security risk, the
district court ordered his release on parole and the court of appeals
affirmed. 10 7 The Supreme Court reversed, emphasizing the appar-
ent danger to national security, and stating that Congress had
properly authorized a denial of parole for security risks.10 In dis-
sent, Justices Black, Douglas, Jackson, and Frankfurter did not
contest the government's power to detain excludable aliens, but
they castigated the majority for condoning a deprivation of liberty
without due process of law.109
III. THE CASE REACHES THE SUPREME COURT
The Haitians questioned the Eleventh Circuit's reliance on
Mezei, "whose continuing validity. . . should be reassessed," and
given the ease with which that court had "misconstrued" the hold-
ing, they urged the Supreme Court to "clarify the meaning" of that
decision.110 Mezei presented precisely the type of situation the en-
try doctrine is intended to preclude-because no country in the
world would accept him, parole entry would have effectuated
Mezei's admission. The Haitians, on the other hand, were not se-
curity risks;' parole would have had no effect on their potentially
limited stay in the United States.
The Haitians disputed the Eleventh Circuit's conclusion that in-
vidious racial or nationality-based discrimination by a federal
105. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 208 (otherwise characterized as "security reasons").
106. Id. at 209.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 216.
109. Id. at 216-28. Justice Jackson stated:
Procedural fairness and regularity are of the indispensable essence of liberty. Se-
vere substantive laws can be endured if they are fairly and impartially applied.
Our law may, and rightly does, place more restrictions on the alien than on the
citizen. But basic fairness in hearing procedures does not vary with the status of
the accused.
Id. at 224-25 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
110. Petitioners' Brief for Writ of Certiorari at 14, Jean III.
111. Louis IV, 544 F. Supp. at 1006.
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agency was beyond constitutional review, citing the plain language
of the fifth amendment 1 2 and several court decisions."13 The en
banc court, holding that the Haitians were safeguarded from dis-
crimination by facially neutral parole criteria, had instructed the
district court on remand to determine only whether lower-level of-
ficials had "a facially legitimate and bona fide reason" for denying
parole. " " This "novel, non-constitutional standard" would deprive
the Haitians of the strict scrutiny appropriate for claims of racial
or nationality-based discrimination and, furthermore, would not
reach future INS treatment of those class members already re-
leased on parole. Discrimination in subsequent exclusionary mat-
ters would be unaffected. 15
The INS insisted that aliens have no constitutional rights re-
garding entry decisions and that discretion to parole is "inextrica-
bly related" to the admission decision process." 6 Therefore, the
entry doctrine removes all rights to challenge parole policy by ex-
cludable aliens. Interference with the attorney general's parole au-
thority would constitute interference with "the inherent sovereign
authority to exclude and detain aliens""' 7 because, according to the
government, permissive parole would attract more illegal aliens.
Once paroled, an alien could easily matriculate into the commu-
nity, and "an alien with a skilled attorney [could] delay the exclu-
sion process for years. '"" 8
Rather than address the question of whether constitutional pro-
tection from invidious discrimination is available to excludable
aliens, the Court held in Jean III that, because statutes and fed-
eral regulations preclude discrimination, the Eleventh Circuit
112. "No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law . U. " .S. CONST. amend. V.
113. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1981) ("Whatever his status under the immigration
laws, an alien is surely a 'person' in any ordinary sense of that term."); Mathews v. Diaz, 426
U.S. 67, 77 (1975) ("The Fifth Amendment ... protects every [alien within the jurisdiction
of the United States] from deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law .... "); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) ("[A]I1 persons within
the territory of the United States are entitled to the protection guaranteed [by the fifth
amendment] ...and that even aliens shall not be . . .deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law."); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) ("These provi-
sions are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction,
without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality .
114. Jean II, 727 F.2d at 978.
115. Petitioners' Reply Brief at 5-6, Jean III.
116. Respondent's Brief Opposing Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11, 15, Jean III.
117. Brief for Respondent at 36, Jean III.
118. Id. at 37-38. "Thus, the availability of parole may have a corrosive effect on the
government's plenary authority to exclude aliens." Id. at 38.
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should not have reached the fifth amendment issue. The majority
determined that, in the absence of clear legislative or agency in-
structions ordering discrimination, such action was prohibited. " 9
While this interpretation strains credulity, the holding will protect
similarly situated aliens from biased parole decisions as long as the
present rules remain in effect. Unfortunately, by not ruling on the
constitutional question, the Court left unsettled an issue that
should be resolved to end the confusion among federal courts. 2 '
The crux of the Court's opinion rests upon the statute authoriz-
ing parole and the regulatory list of excludables who might be con-
sidered eligible for parole "in the public interest."'' Because the
provisions are facially neutral-they do not explicitly state that
"race and national origin are factors that must be considered when
making a parole decision"-and because the parties agreed the lan-
guage required evenhanded application,12 2 the Justices decided no
further action was required. '2  The majority thus accepted state-
ments made by the parties as accurate depictions of the limits be-
yond which immigration officials could not venture. The decision,
therefore, has no bearing upon whether the INS may, in the future,
modify these regulations and intentionally discriminate against a
different refugee population, with the likely consequence of an-
other protracted round of litigation.
The majority's analysis, written by Justice Rehnquist, was at
best a clipped treatment of what has been a painful ordeal for
thousands of refugees. While the decision fortunately militates
against further discriminatory treatment of these Haitian refugees,
Justice Marshall's eloquent and comprehensive dissent, articulates
the deficiencies in the court's reasoning.
Purporting to exercise restraint, the Court creates out of whole
cloth nonconstitutional constraints on the Attorney General's dis-
119. Jean III, 105 S. Ct. at 2998.
120. See Augustin v. Sava, 735 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1984) (excludable alien was entitled to
due process protection); Yiu Sing Chun v. Sava, 708 F.2d 869 (2d Cir. 1983) (same); Haitian
Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982) (excludable aliens have limited due
process rights in petitioning for political asylum); Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654
F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981) (indefinite detention conflicts with requirements of due process
under the law).
121. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
122. Responding to an inquiry from the bench, the Solicitor General confirmed that INS
regulations "inhibited" immigration agents from permitting discrimination, consistent with
the Haitians' argument that the INS is required to apply its policies without regard to race
or national origin. Jean III, 105 S. Ct. at 2998-99.
123. Id. at 2998.
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cretion to parole aliens into this country, flagrantly violating the
maxim that "amendment may not be substituted for construc-
tion," . . . . In my mind, there is no principled way to avoid
reaching the constitutional question presented by the case. Turn-
ing to that question, I would hold that petitioners have a Fifth
Amendment right to parole decisions free from invidious discrim-
ination based on race or national origin.124
Justice Marshall's central objection to the majority decision was
that no statutory or regulatory authorities nor policy statements
produced by the government foreclosed discriminatory decision-
making. The "lengthy list of neutral criteria" cited by the majority
which affect the denial or grant of parole is in fact a list of four
named groups with a fifth category-"aliens whose continued de-
tention is not in the public interest"12 -and are used at the dis-
cretion of the district INS director. These categories are intended
to be merely "consider[edf'1 26 when making a parole decision; they
are not the only factors open for evaluation. Indeed, the fact that
several other INS regulations authorize national origin distinctions
supports a conclusion that such considerations are not beyond the
discretionary powers of INS officials.1 2 7
Stipulation by the parties appears to have been the real basis for
the majority's confidence in the allegedly mandatory neutrality of
the parole power.128 Yet, the dissent makes a persuasive argument
that positions taken by advocates at oral argument do not warrant
such deference from the Court. Regardless of representations made
by the Solicitor General and the Haitians' counsel, no statutory or
regulatory documentation was produced that would carry real
weight; in fact, the government's reply brief to the Eleventh Cir-
cuit en banc court stated, "Congress knows how to prohibit nation-
124. Id. at 3000 (citation omitted) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
125. See supra note 97.
126. 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(a) (1986). The regulation states, "In determining whether or not
aliens who have been or are detained. . . will be paroled out of detention, the district direc-
tor should consider the following .... " Id. There follows a list of exceptions that would be
"in the public interest": pregnant women, juveniles, detainees with close relatives, witnesses,
and the fifth, undefined category. "Unless such criteria are exclusive, however, they are not
necessarily inconsistent with distinctions based on race or national origin. Certainly no plau-
sible argument can be made that the criteria of 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(a) (1986) were intended to
be exclusive." Jean III, 105 S. Ct. at 3004 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
127. Jean III, 105 S. Ct. at 3002 (five regulations listed).
128. In a footnote, Justice Rehnquist wrote, "[W]hen all parties, including the agency
which wrote and enforces the regulations, and the en banc court below, agree that regula-
tions neutral on their face must be applied in a neutral manner, we think that interpretation
arrives with some authority in this Court." Id. at 2999 n.3.
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ality-based distinctions when it wants to do so. In the absence of
such an express prohibition, it should be presumed that the broad
delegation of authority encompasses the power to make national-
ity-based distinctions. '" 129 This statement supports Justice Mar-
shall's contention that the stipulation of neutrality was merely a
litigation strategy adopted by the government.
Justice Marshall criticized the Eleventh Circuit's reliance on
Mezei, distinguishing that holding as limited to denial of due pro-
cess when the excludable alien is a security risk.130 Any weight
which dicta in Mezei and other cases might have carried in sup-
porting the inapplicability of constitutional protections to excluda-
ble aliens has been dissolved by subsequent Court decisions.13' To
regard the entry doctrine as placing an excludable alien beyond the
reach of the fifth amendment would be as specious as conceding
the legal fiction used by the Dred Scott Court.13 2
Justice Marshall closed by articulating governmental interests
that might justify classifying Haitians by race or national origin:
(1) that overall parole denial would deter undocumented Haitians
and not other nationalities from seeking entry, or (2) that adjudi-
cation of asylum applications is hastened by denial of parole. 33 If,
however, the Haitians were detained because the INS believed
they, or blacks in general, are more prone to criminal behavior, or
would otherwise have a detrimental effect upon their new commu-
nities, such detention policy would surely be unconstitutional.13 '
IV. CONCLUSION
Jean III may be considered a partial victory in that henceforth
facially neutral immigration rules, regulations, and statutes may
not be administered in a fashion that discriminates against any
129. Id. at 3002 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 3007.
131. Justice Marshall cited to the same cases discussed in Petitioners' Brief for Writ of
Certiorari, Jean III. Also cited was Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481
(1931), where a Russian corporation successfully filed a claim against the United States
seeking compensation for two vessels it had built for the defendant. The corporation was
held to have been protected against deprivation of property by the fifth amendment: "As
alien friends are embraced within the terms of the Fifth Amendment, it cannot be said their
property is subject to confiscation here . . . ." Id. at 491-92. Volunteer Fleet is frequently
cited in immigration cases addressing the scope of constitutional protection: if alien prop-
erty warrants protection, so much more does an alien's liberty. See Jean III, 105 S. Ct. at
3008 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
132. See supra note 12 and text accompanying notes 21-30.
133. Jean II, 105 S. Ct. at 3011 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 3012.
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refugee group based on race or national origin.1 35 In addition to
eliminating discriminatory denial of parole to eligible refugees, the
decision should preclude consideration of race and nationality in
other immigration proceedings, including deportation and asylum
hearings. In the event of a future influx of refugees-which seems
inevitable in light of the political and economic instability
throughout the world-such draconian measures against an iso-
lated group would be illegal under present INS regulations.
At the same time, it now appears that no particular group may
be favored, meaning those fleeing Marxist regimes should not enjoy
expedited asylum hearings that are less than rigorous in examining
each claimant's alleged "fear of persecution." Salvadorans, Af-
ghans, and Soviet Jews all should be on the same footing in the
eyes of an immigration judge.
In fact, the holding of Jean III permits subsequent plaintiffs a
less demanding showing of discrimination than would have been
required had the Court determined that the fifth amendment ap-
plies to excludable aliens. On remand, this class of Haitians-and
other aliens similarly situated in future litigation-need only show
that race or nationality was considered by an immigration official
deciding whether to grant parole; a constitutional challenge would
have required a far more difficult showing of intentional discrimi-
nation on the part of INS officials. Still, immigration officials need
only offer a "facially legitimate and bona fide reason" ' 6 for such a
decision in order to counter a claim of discrimination-not a diffi-
cult burden to meet. In any case, the Court's requirement of even-
handed treatment based on facially neutral regulations is an im-
portant step toward a more humane immigration law.
The absence of a solid constitutional ruling by the Court does
nothing to ensure that facially neutral policies will remain so. In
response to some future wave of refugees, the INS is free to modify
the current rules by conditioning parole on any number of invidi-
ous classifications, such as religion, national or regional origin,
race, or economic status. Because the Court still has not addressed
whether the fifth amendment precludes such arbitrary government
conduct, the same challenge as was presented by the Haitians in
Jean III would again be raised.
135. The majority instructed the district court to examine whether INS officials made
individual parole decisions, and whether the officials made such decisions without regard to
race or national origin. Id. at 2999.
136. Id. at 2997 (citing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972)).
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Because the United States is experiencing a resurgence of nati-
vist hostility toward immigrants and illegal aliens,13 7 it is critical
that the federal courts consistently uphold the principles of equal
protection and due process in the government's dealings with vul-
nerable alien minorities. When Congress authorizes the INS to
adopt discriminatory regulations, such minorities have recourse
only to the courts, and the courts will continue to disagree as to
what is constitutionally permitted unless the Supreme Court re-
solves the issue. Recognizing that the fifth amendment protects in-
carcerated excludable aliens would hardly interfere with the au-
thority now vested in the executive branch and Congress to decide
which individuals may or may not enter the United States. Rather,
it would ensure integrity in the treatment of refugees.
Viewed differently, the Court's unwillingness to address the con-
stitutional question-the primary point of contention between the
parties in Jean IIP"-and its approval of a nondiscriminatory pa-
role policy may indicate a disposition to require evenhanded INS
treatment of refugees that might eventually ripen into recognition
of a constitutional mandate. It may be significant that the Court
did not express support of Mezei. In coming years the Court may
be willing to scrutinize immigration law and policy more keenly
than in the past.
Some commentators predict that immigration law may become
less restrictive as a result of a gradual liberalization of attitudes
among the American public toward aliens. 39 In Jean III, the Su-
preme Court construed an executive and legislative policy of non-
discrimination with no explicit foundation in statute or agency reg-
ulations, rather than abdicating discretionary power to lower-level
immigration officials. The decision may indeed convey a willing-
137. Elizabeth Hull, Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, characterizes
this nativism as a kind of "compassion fatigue" toward Third World refugees, brought on by
a host of domestic economic and political pressures. See Hull, supra note 14, at 236. Hull
presents the view of several scholars that developed nations have a responsibility to address
the needs of undeveloped nations and, by implication, to aid displaced persons who seek
refuge in wealthier countries. Id. at 247-48 n.94.
138. Brief for Petitioners at 3-4, 21-39, Jean III; Brief for Respondent at 20-35, Jean
III. The first of two questions certified to the Court asked, "Is racial or national origin
discrimination by immigration officials in incarcerating nonresident Haitian aliens seeking
asylum subject to constitutional scrutiny?" Jean v. Nelson, 53 U.S.L.W. 3717 (U.S. Apr. 9,
1985) (No. 84-5240).
139. Schuck, supra note 2, at 1-5, 54-85. The author discusses recent decisions indicating
that courts are more willing to permit "rights against the government to accrue to aliens
without the government's consent and without the formal conditions for immigration having
been observed." Id. at 70.
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ness of the Court to require that INS adhere to policies that guar-
antee a standard of treatment commensurate with constitutional
standards, even though the Constitution itself was not invoked. 4 0
In any case, speculation as to the implications of Jean III cannot
substitute for what was clearly neglected. The Court's failure to
address the constitutional issue permits survival of the legal fiction
that has too long been attached to the entry doctrine and was un-
questioningly approved by the Eleventh Circuit: that excludable
aliens are not "persons" under the fifth amendment. The entry
doctrine is effective and legitimate when applied to decisions con-
cerning the admissibility of an alien but should not be used to
bootstrap the illegitimate proposition that the political branches
may ignore contemporary standards of constitutional due process
and equal protection with respect to excludable aliens. An excluda-
ble alien is indeed "on the threshold of initial entry" into the na-
tional community until legally declared otherwise. Yet this does
not justify invidious discrimination that would be intolerable in
other contexts. "Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for
starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving
it. 14 1 Under Jean III, parole and detention decisions cannot incor-
porate considerations of race or national origin. However, because
the majority chose not to discuss the reasoning of the court below,
the INS and the federal courts are free in other contexts to assign
an extraterrestrial status to excludable aliens. The Court should
ultimately excise the fiction from the entry doctrine and discard it
as artificial, unworthy to serve as even a stone in the foundation of
constitutional doctrine.
Ellen B. Gwynn
140. Schuck labels the ideals toward which immigration law may be moving as "commu-
nitarian," where aliens' legal rights are "based upon individuals' essential and equal human-
ity." Id. at 4. The trend would be comparable to that of the development of public adminis-
trative law away from the individualistic private-law model toward a jurisprudence that
recognizes the "public interest." Id. at 51-53. In the context of exclusion and detention, this
might entail recogniton of greater legal protection of aliens pending admissibility decisions.
141. Berkey v. Third Ave. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926).
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